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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Calpine Corporation appeals from the order of the 
District Court affirming the Bankruptcy Court's decision 
not to award it a break-up fee or expenses in connection 
with its unsuccessful bid to acquire O'Brien Environmental 
Energy, Inc. ("O'Brien"), the Debtor in a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceeding. The term "break-up fee" refers to a 
fee paid by a seller to a prospective purchaser in the event 
that a contemplated transaction is not consummated. This 
appears to be the first court of appeals decision to consider 
the standards that should govern an award of break-up 




The facts of this case are largely undisputed. O'Brien at 
one time developed cogeneration, waste-heat recovery and 
biogas projects for the production of thermal and electrical 
energy. On September 28, 1994, it filed for Chapter 11 
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protection and began operating as a debtor-in-possession 
under 11 U.S.C. S 1107. John Kelly and Glass & 
Associates, a crisis management firm, provided O'Brien 
with interim management services. 
 
In February 1995, Kelly, Arthur Anderson, and counsel 
for O'Brien decided to proceed with a sale of all or almost 
all of O'Brien's assets rather than attempt to continue 
operating O'Brien as a going concern. Representatives of 
O'Brien contacted over 300 potential buyers, and 
approximately 125 expressed interest. The representatives 
then gathered publicly available information about O'Brien 
in "war rooms" in Philadelphia and New York. Potential 
buyers were given access to the rooms upon the signing of 
a confidentiality agreement. 
 
Roughly fifty potential buyers signed agreements and 
were given access. Approximately nineteen later formally 
expressed an interest in purchasing the company, and ten 
submitted bids. In May, seven were invited to improve their 
bids, finish due diligence, and complete term sheets. At 
least five submitted bids to the Debtor, the Equity 
Committee, and the Official Unsecured Creditors' 
Committee (the "Creditors' Committee") and made elaborate 
oral, written, and videotaped presentations. Of the 
submissions received, three were deemed highest and best: 
those of Calpine, NRG Energy, Inc. ("NRG"), and Destec 
Corp. 
 
On July 10, 1995, O'Brien entered into a binding and 
guaranteed purchase agreement with Calpine. The 
agreement provided for the sale of O'Brien's business and 
the transfer of $90 to $100 million of O'Brien's liability to 
Calpine. The agreement did not provide for any payment to 
O'Brien's existing shareholders and did not even provide for 
full payment to creditors. See App. at 311. Significantly for 
purposes of this appeal, Calpine's obligation to perform 
under the contract was conditioned on the parties' ability to 
secure the approval by the Bankruptcy Court of a break-up 
fee of $2 million and expenses up to approximately $2 
million to be paid to Calpine under certain circumstances. 
See App. at 185-89. 
 
O'Brien filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court for such 
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approval on July 7, 1995. The Bankruptcy Court 
considered the motion at a hearing held on August 17, 
1995. The Debtor, the Creditor's Committee, O'Brien's 
secured creditors, and several unsecured creditors each 
supported the motion; the Equity Committee, Wexford 
Management LLC ("Wexford") (O'Brien's controlling 
shareholder), and NRG opposed it.1 
 
The Bankruptcy Court refused to approve the break-up 
fee and expense provisions, expressing concern that 
allowing such fees and expenses would "perhaps chill or at 
best certainly complicate the competitive bidding process." 
App. at 643. The court indicated that it would be willing to 
permit Calpine to seek a break-up fee and expenses at the 
end of the process, but Calpine replied that it would not go 
forward absent the buyer protection it had sought. The 
court adjourned the hearing until August 25, 1995. See 
App. at 643-45. 
 
Notwithstanding its position at the hearing, Calpine soon 
decided to reenter the bidding. On August 25, 1995, all the 
major parties agreed upon bidding procedures, and, on 
August 30, 1995, an order was entered by consent that, 
inter alia, approved a modified version of the Calpine 
contract. The order stated, in part, "Calpine's right to 
request approval from the Court of the allowance and 
payment of a Break-Up Fee and Break-Up Expenses is 
hereby reserved." App. at 694-95. The order further 
provided, "[S]hould the [Calpine Contract] be terminated 
pursuant to Section 14.1(g) thereof, or the Court confirm a 
Plan-based Bid other than Calpine's . . . , the Official 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors . . . , certain of the 
Debtor's secured creditors, . . . as well as Mr. John Kelly in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It is not entirely clear from the record whether it was Wexford or 
Kelly 
who was authorized to speak for the Debtor at the August 17, 1995 
hearing. The brief filed for Wexford, O'Brien's largest shareholder, 
contends it had control of the Board of Directors at that time. See 
Appellees Cogeneration Corp. and Wexford's Br. at 8. The issue was 
litigated, but the litigation resulted in a practical compromise rather 
than a ruling of law. In any event, our resolution of the issues raised by 
this appeal does not turn on a resolution of this controversy, and we 
refer to the position taken by John Kelly as that of the Debtor merely for 
convenience. 
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his capacity as the Debtor's Chief Administrative Officer, 
shall support the allowances and payment of such Break- 
up Fee and Break-up Expense." App. at 695. 
 
An auction followed during which Calpine and NRG 
competed, but NRG filed the last enhanced bid, which the 
court deemed to be the last, best offer. Prior to confirmation 
of NRG's plan, Calpine filed an Application for Payment of 
Fees and Expenses Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 503(b), seeking 
a $2 million break-up fee, $2,250,000 in break-up 
expenses, and interest at the prime rate from January 15, 
1996 through payment of the fee and expenses. NRG, 
Wexford, and the Equity Committee objected to Calpine's 
application; the Creditors' Committee, which had been 
Calpine's supporter from the outset, supported it. 
 
At a hearing held on June 6, 1996, the Bankruptcy Court 
overruled objections to Calpine's right to present an 
application seeking fees, and on August 28, 1996, it held 
an evidentiary hearing on Calpine's application. On 
November 8, 1996, the Bankruptcy Court filed a 
comprehensive opinion denying Calpine's application and 
entered the Order on November 27, 1996. 
 
Calpine appealed to the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey, which denied Calpine's appeal 
by a brief order dated May 29, 1998. Calpine thenfiled a 
timely appeal with this court, challenging both the 
Bankruptcy Court's decision on August 17, 1995 not to 
approve the proffered contract between the Debtor and 
Calpine and the court's November 27, 1996 order denying 




At the outset, we address Appellees' contention that 
Calpine lacks standing to challenge the Bankruptcy Court's 
August 17, 1995 decision and that, therefore, that ruling is 
not before us on this appeal. Appellees reason that because 
only the debtor, O'Brien, had statutory authority to move 
for approval of the contract provisions at the August 
hearing, only O'Brien may appeal the denial of approval. 
 
This court has emphasized that appellate standing in 
bankruptcy cases is limited to "person[s] aggrieved." 
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Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45 F.3d 737, 741 (3d 
Cir. 1995). We consider a person to be "aggrieved" only if 
the bankruptcy court's order "diminishes their property, 
increases their burdens, or impairs their rights." General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Dykes (In re Dykes), 10 F.3d 
184, 187 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, only those "whose rights or 
interests are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily" by 
an order of the bankruptcy court may bring an appeal. Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The "person aggrieved" standard, which is more stringent 
than the constitutional test for standing, serves the acute 
need to limit collateral appeals in the bankruptcy context. 
Id. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained: 
 
       This need [to limit appeals] springs from the nature of 
       bankruptcy litigation which almost always involves the 
       interests of persons who are not formally parties to the 
       litigation. In the course of administration of the 
       bankruptcy estate disputes arise in which numerous 
       persons are to some degree interested. Efficient judicial 
       administration requires that appellate review be limited 
       to those persons whose interests are directly affected. 
 
Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 443 
(9th Cir. 1983). 
 
The question whether a party has standing to appeal in 
a bankruptcy case is generally an issue of fact for the 
district court. See In re Dykes, 10 F.3d at 188. The 
underlying order in this case does not indicate whether the 
District Court considered Calpine's appellate standing. 
Because the facts of this case are not in dispute, however, 
it is appropriate for us to address this issue in the first 
instance. 
 
Courts that have considered appellate standing in the 
context of the sale or other disposition of estate assets have 
generally held that creditors have standing to appeal, but 
disappointed prospective purchasers do not. See, e.g., 
Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci) , 126 F.3d 
380, 388 (2d Cir. 1997); see also In re Nepsco, Inc., 36 B.R. 
25, 26-27 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983). We see no reason to hold 
differently in this case. 
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On August 17, 1995, Calpine concededly was not a 
creditor of O'Brien's estate. Nor did Calpine have a binding 
contract with O'Brien, as the sale of substantially all of a 
debtor's assets is a transaction outside of the ordinary 
course of business, which requires bankruptcy court 
approval to become effective. See 11 U.S.C.S 363(b); 
Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., No. 98- 
3387, 1999 WL 398881, at *4 (3d Cir. June 18, 1999). Nor 
does Calpine's appeal challenge either the "intrinsic 
fairness" of the process by which O'Brien's assets were sold 
or the good faith of NRG as the ultimate purchaser. See 
Kabro Assocs., LLC v. Colony Hill Assocs. (In re Colony Hill 
Assocs.), 111 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 
In this circumstance, we cannot conclude that the 
Bankruptcy Court's decision diminished Calpine's property, 
increased its burdens, or impaired its rights. See In re 
Dykes, 10 F.3d at 187. The only rights Calpine had on 
August 17, 1995 were the right to require O'Brien to seek 
approval by the Bankruptcy Court as per its contract and 
the right to enforce the contract if such approval was 
secured. The first right was duly exercised when O'Brien 
moved for approval at the August hearing; the second right 
never became exercisable because the condition precedent 
to its enforcement never occurred. Thus, neither of 
Calpine's rights was impaired by the Bankruptcy Court's 
decision to deny approval. 
 
Moreover, the order disapproving Calpine's contract 
lessened, rather than increased, Calpine's burdens: it 
relieved Calpine of any contractual duty to perform. Finally, 
Calpine's loss of the profit it hoped to gain from acquiring 
O'Brien is too speculative a harm to constitute injury to 
property for purposes of the standing test. See, e.g., In re 
Colony Hill Assocs., 111 F.3d at 273; Davis v. Seidler (In re 
HST Gathering Co.), 125 B.R. 466, 468 (W.D. Tex. 1991). 
We, therefore, hold that Calpine lacks standing to appeal 
the August 17, 1995 order of the Bankruptcy Court. 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In light of our decision, we need not decide whether Calpine failed to 
preserve its appeal by not filing a notice of appeal from the August 17, 
1995 order. 
 







Calpine also appeals the Bankruptcy Court's order of 
November 27, 1996 denying Calpine's subsequent motion 
for a break-up fee and expenses. The parties concede that 
it has standing on this issue. There is, nonetheless, some 
confusion concerning the legal basis on which Calpine 
made and is prosecuting that motion. Calpine originally 
captioned its motion under 11 U.S.C. S 503(b). At the 
argument before the Bankruptcy Court on June 6, 1996, 
Calpine's counsel stated: "We are not proceeding pursuant 
to 503(b)," although counsel also expressed belief that 
Calpine satisfied the requirements of that provision. App. at 
1027. In reaching its determination, the Bankruptcy Court 
stated: "Calpine . . . is not proceeding here under S 503(b) 
or the traditional administrative expense claim analysis set 
forth in S 503(b). Instead, the request is made under the 
applicable case law setting [forth] standards for approval of 
break-up fees and break-up expenses . . . ." In re O'Brien 
Environmental Energy, Inc., No. 94-26723, slip op. at 30 
(Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 8, 1996). Calpine raises no challenge to 
this portion of the Bankruptcy Court's ruling. 
 
Neither Calpine nor the Bankruptcy Court have cited any 
support for the proposition that courts may create a right 
to recover from the bankruptcy estate where no such right 
exists under the Bankruptcy Code. Nor have we found any 
support for that proposition. The structure of the 
Bankruptcy Code further counsels against judicial 
expansion of the potential for recovery from the debtor's 
estate. The filing of a petition for bankruptcy protection 
under Chapter 11 of the Code creates an estate, consisting 
of all property in which the debtor holds an interest, see 11 
U.S.C. SS 301, 541, 1101, and precludes all efforts to obtain 
or distribute property of the estate other than as provided 
by the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. SS 362, 363, 1123. 
This statutory control over the right to recover property 
from the debtor's estate is integral to the purposes and 
goals of federal bankruptcy law. See, e.g., City of New York 
v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.), 
739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The objectives of federal 
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bankruptcy law can be broadly stated: to provide for an 
equitable settling of creditors' accounts by usurping from 
the debtor his power to control the distribution of his 
assets."). 
 
Respectful of this statutory background, we decline the 
invitation to develop a general common law of break-up 
fees. We instead consider whether any provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code, as it is currently written, authorizes the 
award of break-up fees and expenses to an unsuccessful 




The most likely source of authority for Calpine's motion 
appears to be 11 U.S.C. S 503, the provision on which its 
motion originally relied. The parties concede that any right 
Calpine may have to recover from O'Brien's estate arose 
after O'Brien filed for bankruptcy protection and began 
marketing its assets for sale. Further, claims that arise 
after the date on which the debtor petitioned for 
bankruptcy protection ("post-petition claims") are generally 
allowed, if at all, only as administrative expenses pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. S 503. We, therefore, treat Calpine's arguments 
as addressing whether it is entitled to receive break-up fees 
and expenses under that provision. 
 
Section 503 states, in relevant part: 
 
       (a) an entity may timely file a request for payment of an 
       administrative expense, or may tardily file such a 
       request if permitted by the court for cause. 
 
       (b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed 
       administrative expenses, . . . including -- 
 
       (1) (A) the actual, necessary costs and expense s of 
       preserving the estate . . . . 
 
"For a claim in its entirety to be entitled tofirst priority 
under [S 503(b)(1)(A)], the debt must arise from a 
transaction with the debtor-in-possession. . . .[and] the 
consideration supporting the claimant's right to payment 
[must be] beneficial to the debtor-in-possession in the 
operation of the business." Cramer v. Mammoth Mart, Inc., 
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(In re Mammoth Mart, Inc.), 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir. 
1976). The Bankruptcy Court noted: "A party seeking 
payment of costs and fees as an administrative expense 
must . . . carry the heavy burden of demonstrating that the 
costs and fees for which it seeks payment provided an 
actual benefit to the estate and that such costs and 
expenses were necessary to preserve the value of the estate 
assets." In re O'Brien, slip op. at 30. 
 
We assume that bidding at the sale of O'Brien's assets 
constitutes a transaction with the debtor-in-possession for 
purposes of S 503(b)(1)(A). This assumption is particularly 
appropriate here in light of the Bankruptcy Court's order of 
August 30 1995, which, by "reserving" Calpine's rights, 
suggests that the court anticipated and intended to 
preserve consideration of a later request for feesfiled by 
Calpine. Such fees could be awarded under this section 
only if Calpine's participation in the bidding process was 
necessary to accord the estate an actual benefit. 
 
Calpine argues that, much like in non-bankruptcy 
contexts, break-up fees should be permitted where, after 
careful scrutiny, the court determines that (1)"a debtor 
believes in its business judgment that such fees will benefit 
the estate," (2) there is no proof of self-dealing, and (3) 
there is no proof of specific harm to the bankruptcy estate. 
Appellant's Br. at 21. 
 
The bankruptcy courts and district courts that have 
addressed the standard for break-up fees and expenses in 
bankruptcy proceedings have adopted very different 
approaches. Some have assumed that break-up fees and 
expenses should be treated in bankruptcy the same way 
that they are treated in the corporate world, as Calpine 
contends. In In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, L.P., 96 B.R. 
24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), the debtor, the Creditors' 
Committee, and a potential purchaser negotiated a form 
contract that provided for the payment of $500,000 in 
break-up fees and served as the basis for an auction of the 
company. In ruling on a request to recover the fees 
following the auction, the bankruptcy court began by 
reviewing the treatment of break-up fees outside of 
bankruptcy. It stated: 
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        In the corporate takeover context it is recognized that 
       breakup fees are not illegal where they enhance rather 
       than hamper the bidding. Breakup fees and other 
       strategies may "be legitimately necessary to convince a 
       `white knight' to enter the bidding by providing some 
       form of compensation for the risks it is undertaking." 
       When reasonable in relation to the bidder's efforts and 
       to the magnitude of the transaction, breakup fees are 
       generally permissible. But if such a fee is too large, it 
       may chill the bidding to the detriment of shareholders 
       (or, if the company for sale is insolvent, its creditors). 
       In such instances, the fee is not protected by the 
       business judgment rule (which bars judicial inquiry 
       into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith 
       and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful 
       and legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes) and 
       is thus subject to court review. 
 
Id. at 28 (citations omitted). The court concluded that 
"[t]hese principles have vitality by analogy in the chapter 11 
context," and upheld payment of the break-up fees. Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York 
followed a similar approach in Official Committee of 
Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 147 
B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). There, the debtor moved for 
authorization under S 363 to enter into a letter agreement 
with a prospective lender. Under the contract, the lender 
would agree to fund the debtor's plan of reorganization in 
return for assurances that it would receive reimbursement 
of its expenses and a break-up fee should the transaction 
not go forward. Although the Subordinated Bondholders' 
Committee objected to the reimbursement and break-up fee 
provisions, the bankruptcy court approved the lender's 
proposal, deferring to the debtor's business judgment. On 
appeal, the district court identified three questions that a 
court should ask in deciding whether to approve break-up 
fee provisions: "(1) is the relationship of the parties who 
negotiated the break-up fee tainted by self-dealing or 
manipulation; (2) does the fee hamper, rather than 
encourage bidding; [and] (3) is the amount of the fee 
unreasonable relative to the proposed purchase price?" Id. 
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at 657. Because it found that the bankruptcy court had 
properly answered each of these questions in the negative, 
the district court affirmed. 
 
Other courts have authorized more searching review, 
identifying numerous factors that a court should consider 
in determining whether a break-up fee is permissible in the 
context of any particular bankruptcy. In In re Hupp 
Industries, Inc., 140 B.R. 191 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992), the 
debtor sought authorization to enter into a letter of intent 
that would have provided for the sale of many of the 
debtor's assets under 11 U.S.C. S 363 and obligated the 
debtor to pay up to $150,000 in break-up fees and 
expenses if the deal were not consummated. The Creditors' 
Committee and a principal secured creditor objected. The 
court identified seven "[s]ignificant factors to be considered 
in determining the propriety of allowing break-up fee 
provisions" in the context of "a major preconfirmation 
transaction": 
 
       (1) Whether the fee requested correlates with a 
       maximization of value to the debtor's estate; 
 
       (2) Whether the underlying negotiated agreement is  an 
       arms-length transaction between the debtor's estate 
       and the negotiating acquirer; 
 
       (3) Whether the principal secured creditors and th e 
       official creditors committee are supportive of the 
       concession; 
 
       (4) Whether the subject break-up fee constitutes a  fair 
       and reasonable percentage of the proposed purchase 
       price; 
 
       (5) Whether the dollar amount of the break-up fee is so 
       substantial that it provides a "chilling effect" on other 
       potential bidders; 
 
       (6) The existence of available safeguards beneficial to 
       the debtor's estate; 
 
       (7) Whether there exists a substantial adverse imp act 
       upon unsecured creditors, where such creditors are in 
       opposition to the break-up fee. 
 
Id. at 193, 194. 
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The court further remarked, "In the context of a 
nonbankruptcy asset sale, . . . break-up fees are 
presumptively appropriate in view of the business judgment 
rule, and thusly, seldom require judicial attention. In the 
bankruptcy context, however, the Court must be 
necessarily wary of any potential detrimental effect that an 
allowance of such a fee would visit upon the debtor's 
estate." Id. (citation omitted). After"carefully scrutiniz[ing]" 
the bidding incentives, the court concluded that they 
"would only be an unwarranted expense upon the Debtor's 
estate" and refused to approve the agreement. Id. at 196. 
 
Finally, in In re America West Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994), the debtor sought approval of an 
interim procedures agreement that would have provided for 
payment of between four and eight million dollars in break- 
up fees. The debtor, the Creditor's Committee, the Equity 
Committee, and the debtor's prospective contract partner 
all supported authorization of the agreement. The court, 
however, refused to apply the business judgment rule, 
which it recognized had been applied outside of the 
bankruptcy context, stating: "Acquisition of an ongoing 
business which is in bankruptcy is fundamentally different 
from that of an acquisition involving parties not in 
bankruptcy." Id. at 911. It held: 
 
       [T]he standard is not whether a break-up fee is within 
       the business judgment of the debtor, but whether the 
       transaction will "further the diverse interests of the 
       debtor, creditors and equity holders, alike." The 
       proposed break-up fee must be carefully scrutinized to 
       insure that the Debtor's estate is not unduly burdened 
       and that the relative rights of the parties in interest are 
       protected. The analysis conducted by the Court must 
       therefore include a determination that all aspects of 
       the transaction are in the best interests of all 
       concerned. 
 
Id. at 912. 
 
The court noted that the debtor had been "thoroughly 
marketed" and concluded that "the proposed break-up fee 
w[ould] not induce further bidding or bidding generally" but 
would "unnecessarily chill[ ] bidding and potentially 
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deplete[ ] assets that c[ould] be better utilized to help fund 
a plan of reorganization and continue to provide funds for 
professionals, attorneys, accountants and consultants to 
that end." Id. at 913. It held, "No funds of the estate should 
be used to pay break-up fees in a transaction that .. . 
would appear to yield a large profit to the top bidder." Id. 
 
We have reviewed these cases and considered the 
different approaches they represent. None, however, offers 
a compelling justification for treating an application for 
break-up fees and expenses under S 503(b) differently from 
other applications for administrative expenses under the 
same provision. We therefore conclude that the 
determination whether break-up fees or expenses are 
allowable under S 503(b) must be made in reference to 
general administrative expense jurisprudence. In other 
words, the allowability of break-up fees, like that of other 
administrative expenses, depends upon the requesting 
party's ability to show that the fees were actually necessary 
to preserve the value of the estate. Therefore, we conclude 
that the business judgment rule should not be applied as 
such in the bankruptcy context. Nonetheless, the 
considerations that underlie the debtor's judgment may be 
relevant to the Bankruptcy Court's determination on a 




All parties recognize that break-up fees and expenses are 
accepted in corporate merger and acquisitions transactions. 
In summarizing the corporate use of break-up fees, Calpine 
has explained that such provisions are designed to provide 
a prospective acquirer with some assurance that it will be 
compensated for the time and expense it has spent in 
putting together its offer if the transaction is not completed 
for some reason, usually because another buyer appears 
with a higher offer. Such provisions may also encourage a 
prospective bidder to do the due diligence that is the 
prerequisite to any bid by assuring the prospective bidder 
that it will receive compensation for that undertaking if it is 
unsuccessful. 
 
Not all of the purposes that break-up fees serve in 
corporate transactions are permissible in bankruptcy. 
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Although the assurance of a break-up fee may serve to 
induce an initial bid (a permissible purpose), it may also 
serve to advantage a favored purchaser over other bidders 
by increasing the cost of the acquisition to the other 
bidders (an impermissible purpose). 
 
Moreover, even if the purpose for the break-up fee is not 
impermissible, the break-up fee may not be needed to 
effectuate that purpose. For example, in some cases a 
potential purchaser will bid whether or not break-up fees 
are offered. This can be expected to occur whenever a 
potential purchaser determines that the cost of acquiring 
the debtor, including the cost of making the bid, is less 
than the estimated value the purchaser expects to gain 
from acquiring the company. In such cases, the award of a 
break-up fee cannot be characterized as necessary to 
preserve the value of the estate. See generally , Bruce A. 
Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 




The Bankruptcy Court identified at least nine factors that 
it viewed as relevant in deciding whether to award Calpine 
a break-up fee and expenses, which we summarize as 
follows: (1) is the relationship of the parties who negotiated 
the break-up fee tainted by self-dealing or manipulation; (2) 
does the fee hamper, rather than encourage bidding; (3) is 
the amount of the fee unreasonable relative to the proposed 
purchase price; (4) did the unsuccessful bidder (Calpine) 
place the estate property in a sales configuration mode to 
attract other bidders to the auction; (5) did the request for 
a break-up fee serve to attract or retain a potentially 
successful bid, establish a bid standard or minimum for 
other bidders, or attract additional bidders; (6) does the fee 
requested correlate with a maximization of value to the 
Debtor's estate; (7) are the principal secured creditors and 
the official creditors committee supportive of the 
concession; (8) were safeguards beneficial to the debtor's 
estate available; and (9) was there a substantial adverse 
impact on unsecured creditors, where such creditors are in 
opposition to the break-up fee? 
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After weighing these various factors, the Bankruptcy 
Court concluded that Calpine had not met the 
requirements to recover break-up fees or expenses. 
Although the court found no evidence of self-dealing and 
concluded that "the requested break-up fee and break-up 
expenses [were] within the range of fees approved by some 
courts," it put most emphasis on its belief that approving 
Calpine's request for a break-up fee at the August 17, 1999 
hearing would have "chill[ed] or at best certainly 
complicate[d] the competitive bidding process." In re 
O'Brien, slip op. at 39. The court further found that the 
Debtor, not Calpine or NRG, did the work of putting O'Brien 
into a sales configuration mode (the fourth factor), and 
noted that even before Calpine had emerged as a serious 
bidder, O'Brien solicited bids from numerous companies 
and pursued serious negotiations with at least five of them. 
 
The court rejected any contention that the break-up fee 
provisions had attracted or retained a potentially successful 
bid, established a bid standard or minimum for other 
bidders, or attracted additional bidders (the fifth factor). 
The court noted that although it had originally been 
suggested by the Debtor that the break-up fee was needed 
to attract Calpine's bid, Calpine eventually decided to 
reenter the bidding after approval for that fee had been 
denied. Moreover, the court noted that the Calpine and 
NRG bids changed substantially over the bidding process, 
suggesting that Calpine's initial bid did not serve as a 
standard for other bidders. 
 
Ultimately, "the Court [could] draw no correlation 
between the request for break-up fees and break-up 
expenses and the value ultimately brought to the estate by 
the competitive bidding process" (the sixth factor). Id. at 40. 
It did recognize that permitting Calpine to recover the fee 
and expenses would not injure unsecured creditors (the 
ninth factor) who will be paid in full in any event. It found, 
however, that awarding the fee and expenses would"have 
an adverse effect of holders of old equity of O'Brien by the 
dilution of at least a portion of the value that th[e] Court 
determined was provided to them pursuant to the 
successful NRG bid." Id. at 42. 
 





Rather than adopting the specific factors the Bankruptcy 
Court identified as the appropriate test to be used for all 
break-up fee determinations, we consider whether the 
record evidence supports the Bankruptcy Court's implicit 
conclusion that awarding Calpine break-up fees was not 
necessary to preserve the value of O'Brien's estate. As we 
have explained, that inquiry stems directly from 
S 503(b)(1)(A), which requires that an expense provide some 
benefit to the debtor's estate. 
 
As we have recognized, such a benefit could be found if 
assurance of a break-up fee promoted more competitive 
bidding, such as by inducing a bid that otherwise would 
not have been made and without which bidding would have 
been limited. Calpine argues that the fee and expenses were 
necessary to retain its bid and contends that it was 
improper for the Bankruptcy Court to draw a contrary 
conclusion from Calpine's decision to return to the bidding. 
We recognize that Calpine's decision to return to the 
bidding may have been influenced by the Bankruptcy 
Court's expressed willingness to reserve the question of fees 
for later determination. Nonetheless, when Calpine decided 
to reenter the bidding, it knew that it risked not receiving 
any break-up fees or expenses. Its decision to proceed in 
the face of this risk undercuts its current contention that 
it viewed the fees and expenses as necessary to make its 
continued involvement worthwhile. Indeed, the fact that 
O'Brien turned out to be worth at least $52 million more 
than Calpine's original bid (judging from what NRG was 
ultimately willing to pay) strongly suggests that it was the 
prospect of purchasing O'Brien cheaply, rather than the 
prospect of break-up fees or expenses, that lured Calpine 
back into the bidding. 
 
Calpine also contends that its bid promoted competitive 
bidding by serving as a minimum or floor bid. Calpine's 
offer for the debtor's assets encompassed in the July 1995 
agreement with the debtor was effectively the first bid, and 
by definition, the lowest, at least for that moment. The 
Bankruptcy Court, however, was not satisfied with the 
mere showing that later bids exceeded Calpine's initial one. 
Rather, the court required some showing that Calpine's bid 
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served as a catalyst to higher bids. We agree that this was 
a relevant inquiry and conclude that Calpine failed to make 
any such showing. 
 
Arguably, if the availability of break-up fees and expenses 
were to induce a bidder to research the value of the debtor 
and convert that value to a dollar figure on which other 
bidders can rely, the bidder may have provided a benefit to 
the estate by increasing the likelihood that the price at 
which the debtor is sold will reflect its true worth. Calpine 
argues that it performed this research function and that the 
fee and expenses were necessary to induce it to do so. 
Calpine's argument ignores the fact that much of the 
information bidders needed to evaluate O'Brien was 
gathered by O'Brien itself at its own expense. Moreover, the 
record in this case suggests that Calpine had strong 
financial incentives to undertake the cost of submitting a 
bid, including the cost of researching the company's worth, 
even in the absence of any promise of reimbursement. We 
cannot conclude on this record that it was error for the 
Bankruptcy Court to find that the break-up fees and 
expenses were not necessary to induce Calpine's bid. 
 
Finally, Calpine argues that the presence of competitive 
bidding during the O'Brien asset sale necessarily proves 
that the break-up fee and expense provisions did not chill 
the bidding, as the Bankruptcy Court feared. This is a 
logical fallacy. While it is true that bidding remained 
competitive in the face of uncertainty over whether such 
fees would be awarded, the bidding might have been even 
more heated had the court definitively ruled that Calpine 
was not entitled to a break-up fee or expenses earlier in the 
process. The results of the bidding therefore do not prove 
what effect the break-up fee and expense provisions had on 
other bidders' behavior. We note in this regard that NRG 
claims that its winning bid was no more than $1,000,000 
higher than Calpine's final offer. See Appellees 
Cogeneration Corp. and Wexford's Br. at 21. If this claim is 
accurate, then the award of $4,250,000 in break-up fees 
and expenses certainly would have chilled the bidding by 
making NRG's bid, which otherwise would have been the 
winning bid, uneconomical. 
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The record thus adequately supports the conclusion that 
awarding break-up fees and expenses to Calpine was not 
actually necessary to preserve the value of O'Brien's estate, 
and because this is the dispositive inquiry in a bankruptcy 





For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court denying Calpine's appeal from that decision. 
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